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Abstract: The goal of this paper is to examine whether IMF lending programs in the
MENA region lead international lenders to perceive lower lending risks and generate
moral hazard as reflected in a shift in the maturity composition of international debt
toward long-term debt flows. We find that IMF credit in general generated moral
hazard in MENA after the IMF large-scale rescue package to Mexico.

The goal of this paper is to examine whether the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
lending programs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region lead, ceteris paribus,
international lenders to perceive lower lending risks and generate moral hazard. Such moral
hazard is reflected in a shift in the maturity composition of international debt toward long-term
debt flows. The hypothesis we investigate is whether lenders’ perceptions about risk improve,
tilting the maturity composition of lending in favor of long-term debt as the result of IMF

involvement and the expectation of a bailout at times of crisis. Normally when lenders’
perceptions about default risk improve, they would tend to increase the overall level of lending
and lengthen the maturity of lending. If expectations of an IMF bailout reduce investors’ risk
perceptions and generate an increase in the maturity of international loans, then such reaction
could reasonably be used as a measure for the existence of moral hazard. The alternative
hypothesis is that expected IMF lending does not distort investors’ perceptions of risk and
therefore does not have a significant impact on the maturity composition of international debt.
The examination of the IMF-induced moral hazard hypothesis is a key component in the
debate on international financial architecture reforms. Alternatives to the large-scale IMF rescue
packages, such as the inclusion of collective action clauses and universal debt rollover options to
loan contracts, and empowerment of IMF to impose a standstill on payments, have been
suggested in different fora with the objective of reducing the frequency and severity of financial
crises and apparent investors’ moral hazard.
This paper contributes to the literature on IMF-induced moral hazard in three ways. We
examine for the first time in this literature the moral hazard question from the perspective of the
maturity composition of international debt. Second we allow for the differential moral hazard
impacts of the various types of IMF lending programs.[1] Third we examine the MENA region,
which hardly attracted attention in the empirical literature. The importance of examining this
region stems from the large external finance needed to support growth and development.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief literature review
of the literature on IMF catalytic effects and IMF-induced moral hazard. Section II discusses
IMF lending to the MENA region. Section III discusses the hypothesis, estimation methodology,
the empirical model, and data sources. Section IV presents the empirical results. We close with
conclusions.
I. Literature Review
To set our research question in the proper context it is desirable to discuss two
interrelated strands of the empirical literature on the IMF. The first is the IMF catalytic effects
literature, which examines the effect of IMF lending on capital flows. The second is the IMFinduced moral hazard literature, which argues that IMF lending reduces risk perception mainly
among investors and generates moral hazard.

The focus of the IMF catalytic effects literature is whether IMF lending catalyzes private
capital flows, which are needed to cover the external finance needs of countries undertaking
macroeconomic and structural adjustment. The catalysis stems from the informational role of the
IMF and the liquidity that IMF programs provide (Rodrick 1995; Bird and Rowlands 2000). In
addition, by agreeing to an IMF program the government can signal its commitment to economic
reform. Bird and Rowlands (2000) argue that by putting at stake own resources, the IMF would
improve the quality of adjustment advice. IMF lending achieves some risk-sharing function at
the same time it helps reduce the financing gap in program countries. Private markets can
respond positively to the liquidity and commitment factors resulting in positive catalytic effects.
The IMF catalytic effects have received mixed support in the empirical literature. Some
studies have found that the presence of significant catalytic effects depends on whether private
lending is a substitute or a complement to IMF lending (Joyce 1992; Bird 1994 and 1995). The
evidence however leans towards IMF lending being a substitute for private capital flows (Faini et
al 1991; Killick 1995), and therefore IMF lending does not generate significant catalytic effect.

One important issue that the IMF catalytic effects literature failed to address is
the influence of IMF lending on the maturity composition of capital flows, in
particular short-term lending flows. Short-term lending matters because it is a major
contributing factor to the Mexican and East Asian financial crises of the second half
of the 1990s and is important if we want to avert similar crises in the MENA region.
We focus on the maturity composition of international capital flows in this paper.
In the IMF-induced moral hazard literature, IMF lending has been criticized for its moral
hazard impact on international financial markets. Calomiris (1998), for example, have argued
that IMF programs have led to moral hazard with less prudent policies of risk taking by lenders
during the Mexican and Asian crises.
The empirical literature on moral hazard has focused on the existence of distortions in the
pricing of credit to emerging economies. These studies have mainly examined whether IMF
lending lowers risks to lenders and reduces bond spreads. Zhang (1999), Lane and Phillips
(2000), and Kamin (2001) found evidence that bond spreads in emerging markets increase
following crises in which IMF extended crisis lending, which yields no support to the IMFinduced moral hazard hypothesis. In contrast, Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer (2002)
found that by not supporting Russia’s government after the 1998 crisis the IMF sent a signal to

international financial markets that lenders will not be bailed out, resulting in an increase in the
level and the cross-country dispersion of spreads.
None of the above studies, however, has analyzed the potential differential impact of the
various IMF programs on moral hazard. These programs differ in their objectives, conditionality,
country eligibility, and terms of borrowing.

II. IMF Lending to the MENA Region
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is comprised of fourteen countries
which are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. This classification follows the World Bank’s Global
Development Finance (GDF) regional classification. Although GDF classifies Turkey under
Europe and Central Asia, in this paper we classify Turkey also as a MENA region country,
bringing the number of MENA countries to fifteen.
Out of the fifteen countries, the IMF extended programs to seven countries during 199297: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. In this paper we exclude
Algeria because of the political problems the country experienced in the 1990’s, which might
influence our estimation results.
The IMF has provided regular lending to these six countries in the form of either StandBy Arrangements (SBA) or extended arrangements (see Table 1). Out of the six countries, five
countries had SBAs with the IMF. Turkey obtained by far the largest SBA credit in the region in
1994 amounting to SDR 611 million or about $880 million. However, relative to GDP, this IMF
credit amounted to one half of one percentage point of GDP, one of the lowest in the region. On
the other hand, Yemen obtained IMF credit, which amounted to about 4 percent of its GDP,
which relative to GDP is the largest in the region. Given the limited access of many countries in
the MENA region to international capital markets, we think it is quite appropriate to interpret the
size of SBA credit relative to GDP as an indicator of the size of the economic problem the
country faces.
One interesting observation about SBA lending to the MENA countries is that the
commitment to economic reform, as reflected by the percentage of withdrawn resources to the
agreed credit, is positively related to the relative size of SBA and therefore the size of the
economic problem.

Jordan and Yemen had extended arrangements with the IMF subsequent to their SBAs.
Jordan had two extended arrangements starting 1994, each amounting to 5 percent of GDP and
were about triple the size of the SBA credit the country obtained between 1992 and
1994. Similarly for Yemen the credit size of the extended arrangement was more than double
that of its SBA.
In the case of Egypt’s SBA and extended arrangements, no withdrawal took place, which
could be explained in terms of the Egyptian government’s desire to only get the IMF’s seal of
approval for its macroeconomic policies and use perhaps cheaper sources of financing. Note that
during that period, Egypt accumulated foreign exchange reserves that reached about $18 billion
in 1998, and therefore was not in dire need for foreign exchange.

III. Hypothesis, Estimation Methodology, Empirical Model and Data Sources
A. Hypothesis
The hypothesis of interest is whether IMF lending induces moral hazard that takes the
form less short-term debt flows relative to total debt flows. We test for the presence of IMF
lending induced moral hazard by comparing the effects of different expected IMF lending
programs on short-term debt flows relative to total debt flows before and after a major IMF
rescue package. By using expected IMF lending programs we appropriately model the
relationship between private capital flows and IMF lending in which the former lead the latter in
anticipation of bailouts.
Empirically, we will compare the effect of IMF lending on the maturity of international
debt flows in the period following the Mexican crisis and the associated IMF rescue package to
the pre-crisis period. We select the Mexican crisis because it was the first large-scale spending
program, which the IMF extended in the 1990s. Our approach is similar to that in Dell’Ariccia,
Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer (2002), Lane and Phillips (2000), and Kamin (2001).
B. Estimation Methodology
Because it is likely that borrowing country characteristics influence short-term capital
flows, we use a one-way error component model to account for those factors in the empirical
model (Hsiao 1986; Baltagi 1995). The decision to treat the effects as a fixed or random effects
model is based on Hausman’s specification test.

C. Empirical Model
The empirical model that we estimate is given by
STD i t =

+

+

GDP i, t-1 +

DEBT i, t-1 +

CREDIT i, t-1 +

INSTDELTA i, t-1 +

IMF i, t+1 +

DEFICIT i, t-1 +

OPEN i, t-1

WITHDRAWN i, t+1 + u it

The dependent variable STD is the net flows of short-term foreign debt as a
percentage of total external debt net flows, GDP is real GDP in billions of US
dollars, DEBT is total external debt in billions of US dollars, INSTDELTA is the
change in investors’ perceptions about the institutional environment, OPEN is the
degree of openness of the economy, CREDIT is private credit as a percentage of
GDP, IMF is the IMF agreed program credit as a percentage of GDP,
and WITHDRAWN is the withdrawn IMF program credit as a percentage of program
credit, and u is a composite error term.
The IMF variables IMF and WITHDRAWN are led one period ahead to account
for investors’ expectations of IMF lending and the country commitment to economic
reform. The remaining explanatory variables constitute the economic fundamentals
that may affect the maturity of international loans. These variables are lagged one
period to allow for the fact that the changes in loan maturity this period may reflect
the fundamentals at the end of the previous period. These variables are similar to
those used by Rodrick and Velasco (1999). [2]
The dependent variable, STD, measures the importance of the short-term debt
flows relative to total debt flows. Riskier countries, other things being equal, are
expected to attract relatively more short-term debt flows. GDP accounts for the level
of economic activity in the economy. Economies with higher GDP levels are expected
to attract a lower proportion of short-term debt flows. DEBT accounts for the overall
level of indebtedness of the country. We expect to find positive relationship between

short-term debt flows and the level of total debt; ceteris paribus, as total debt
increases, default risk increases and therefore the relative importance of short-term
debt flows would also increase. INSTDELTA are proxied by the change in the rule of
law and captures changes in investors’ perceptions about default risk and, ceteris
paribus, is expected to lead to an increase in the relative share of short-term debt
flows. OPEN is an indicator of the ability of a country to purchase foreign reserves in
the economy. Therefore a higher degree of openness of the country lowers its default
risk. Even if the economy does not have current account surplus, a more open
economy is more integrated into the world economy, has better access to international
capital markets, and is less likely to default on international debt than a less open
economy. Hence, ceteris paribus, more open economies attract in relative terms less
short-term debt flows and more long-term debt flows. Therefore, we expect to find a
negative relationship between the degree of openness and the relative importance of
short-term debt flows.
CREDIT accounts for the degree of financial development in the economy.
The more financially developed the country, the more likely it will be able to attract a
higher proportion of long-term loans. Therefore we expect a negative sign for the
estimated coefficient for CREDIT. IMFaccounts for investors’ expectations of IMF
liquidity provided under a rescue package. The expectations of an IMF program
increase the perceived chances of bailout, improve risk perceptions and therefore
result in a shift toward relative more long-term loans. In the regressions below we use
two specifications of this variable. One specification does
not distinguish between the different IMF programs and aims to capture the overall
lending effect of IMF programs. The other specification makes such distinction and
aims at capturing the program specific effects.
WITHDRAWN accounts for investors’ expectations about the country’s commitment to
economic reform program agreed with the IMF. If lenders expect that the country is committed

to the economic reform program, then country will be able to withdraw the available IMF
program resources, and there will be the expectation that the country fundamentals will improve
and therefore it will be safer to increase the maturity of the loans.
D. Data Sources
We construct a balanced panel data set for the six MENA countries discussed above for
the period 1992-1997. The data set is drawn from three main sources. The first is the history of
IMF lending arrangements available from the IMF website, which provides data on IMF lending
arrangements and the amount of credit withdrawn. The second is Global Development Finance,
which provides data on debt flows. The third is he International Country Risk Guide, which
provides data on political risk, including the rule of law component. We use the rule of law to
proxy for investors’ perceptions about the institutional environment. The rule of law is defined as
"…the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions
to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes." The variable ranges from 0 to 6. Lower
scores indicate "a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims."
Upon changes in government, new leaders "may be less likely to accept the obligations of the
previous regime." Higher scores indicate "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and
provisions for an orderly succession of power."
IV. Empirical Results

Hausman specification test suggests the appropriateness of the random effects
model. Table 2 presents the empirical results from different specifications of the
estimation equation. The first specification includes the effect of IMF lending in
general. The other two specifications are for SBAs and Extended Arrangements.
Based on the Wald test statistic, we fail to reject the hypothesis that all slope
parameters are equal to zero for the SBA and Extended Arrangements specifications.
Thus the focus of this section is on the effect of IMF lending in general.
The effect of IMF lending in general was statistically insignificant in the pre-crisis
period. In the post-crisis period, however, IMF lending seems to have reduced lending risk and
therefore relative short-term debt flows. An increase in IMF credit by 1 percentage point resulted
in a reduction in short-term lending flows by about 7 percentage points. Since we control for the

total level of debt and economic fundamentals, we conclude that IMF lending in general
introduced some measure of moral hazard in international lending in the MENA region during
the post-crisis period.

The level of real GDP appears to have lowered risk in the pre-crisis period
leading to a reduction in the relative role of short-term debt. However, higher levels of
real GDP led to the opposite result in the post-crisis period. An increase in the level of
total external debt, ceteris paribus, increased relative short-term debt flows because of
the increase in lending risk. The coefficient multiplies in sign in the post crisis period,
which suggests that the Mexican crisis worsened risk perceptions among
investors. Improvement in investors’ perceptions about institutional development, on
the other hand, reduced relative short-term debt flows, a result consistent with the
results of Mina (2002). This result is interesting and opens up the door for further
investigation about the influence of institutional factors on capital flows and how
these factors are related to default risk.
Fiscal deficit increased relative short-term debt flows in the post-crisis period
since larger deficits increase default risk, ceteris paribus. Comparing the sign and
coefficient size to those for the pre-crisis period, this result seems to confirm our
interpretation that investors’ risk perceptions worsened in the post-crisis period. The
degree of financial reduced relative short-term debt flows in the post-crisis period.

V. Conclusion

In this paper we have examined the issue of whether IMF lending generates
moral hazard in the MENA region through its effects on the maturity composition of
international debt flows. The importance of the maturity of international debt stems
from the significant role that short-term capital flows played in the 1990’s
international financial crises. We found that IMF lending programs in general tend to

reduce short-term debt flows relative to total debt flows especially in the post
Mexican crisis period and therefore generate moral hazard.

Endnotes
1.

For an examination of the effects of IMF programs on the access to international capital
markets, see for example, Bird and Rowlands (1997, 1999a, 1999b, and 2000), Bird, Mori,
and Rowlands (1999). For an examination of the effects of IMF programs on the cost of
borrowing, see for example Eichengreen and Mody (2000 and 2001). These authors discuss
the signaling and commitment effects of IMF programs in examining the effect on countries
access to international bonds markets, but do not empirically examine these effects nor
separate them by IMF programs.

2.

In examining the determinants of extended debt maturity Rodrick and Velasco (1999) use
income per capita in log form, the ratios of M2, external debt, and imports to GDP, and a
corruption index.
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TABLE 1-- IMF LENDING PROGRAMS FOR THE MENA COUNTRIES

IMF credit
Date of
Expiration or
Agreed IMF credit withdrawn
arrangement cancellation date
(millions of
(millions of SDR)
SDRs)

IMF credit
(percent
of GDP)

Withdrawn
credit
(percent of
agreed
credit)

Stand-by arrangements

Egypt

Oct-96

Sep-98

271.4

0.0

0.6

0.0

Yemen

Mar-96

Jun-97

132.4

132.4

3.7

100.0

Turkey

Jul-94

Mar-96

610.5

460.5

0.5

75.4

Jordan

Feb-92

Feb-94

44.4

44.4

1.2

100.0

Morocco

Jan-92

Mar-93

91.9

18.4

0.4

20.0

Extended arrangements

Yemen

Oct-97

Oct-01

72.9

46.5

1.7

63.8

Jordan

Feb-96

Feb-99

238.04

202.52

5.3

85.1

Jordan

May-94

Feb-96

189.3

130.32

4.5

68.8

Egypt

Sep-93

Sep-96

400.0

0.0

1.2

0.0

Tunisia

Jul-88

Jul-92

207.3

207.3

2.8

100.0

TABLE 2: EFFECT OF IMF PROGRAMS ON SHORT-TERM LENDING FLOWS TO THE MENA
REGION
Dependent Variable: STD

GDP i,t-1

DEBTi,t-1

INSTDELTAi,t1

DEFICITi,t-1

OPENi,t-1

CREDITi,t-1

IMF

SBA

Withdrawn SBA

(1)

(2)

(3)

IMF Credit

Stand-by arrangements

Extended arrangements

1992-94

1995-97

1992-94

1995-97

1992-94

1995-97

***

***

-0.003

*

1.969

-0.153

0.244

-0.319**

0.408

(0.036)

(0.568)

(0.083)

(0.261)

(0.152)

(0.259)

2.424*

48.901*

8.895**

-7.615

9.749**

-23.347*

(1.314)

(26.967)

(4.372)

(9.188)

(4.581)

(0.104)

4.471

984.361***

30.705

-115.55

18.189

-802.289**

(12.052)

(342.834)

(26.714)

(246.89)

(33.924)

(369.089)

-12.429***

60.109**

20.827***

-30.089

-26.386**

-118.351*

(2.107)

(30.073)

(7.532)

(21.331)

(11.510)

(67.681)

-1.768***

44.383***

0.025

8.975

-3.215*

-12.804

(0.526)

(16.998)

(1.330)

(6.549)

(1.954)

(9.786)

3.723***

-24.259***

6.901**

-20.978

11.773**

-8.454

(1.002)

(6.302)

(3.016)

(12.569)

(5.074)

(12.491)

0.010

-7.024**

(0.052)

(2.771)
83.252

-522.271

(256.089)

(352.998)

-2.156

2.529

(2.742)

(2.481)

Extended
arrangements

Withdrawn
extended
arrangements
resources

-208.024*

88.135

(117.159)

(91.675)

14.713*

9.772

(8.244)

(10.951)

112.478

5618.17***

-223.445

-200.458

115.758***

1125.58

(71.650)

(2183.84)

(207.931)

(378.623)

(184.233)

(1043.135)

No. of Obs.

18

12

18

12

18

12

Wald Chi
Squared

293

43

15

11

13

16

Constant

Notes: For the first specification, regressions are corrected for panel heteroskedasticity and within-panel
correlation. For the second and third specifications, regressions are corrected for panel heteroskedasticity.

